Guest Op-Ed: Hanan Mohammed
Disinformation is not just present in Libya’s conflict. It is part of how the conflict works.
A rapid rise in the use of social media came with the collapse of the Gaddafi government and the First Libyan Civil War in 2011. What began as a tool for mobilization and citizen journalism quickly became something more complex. The growth did not slow down. It continued through years of instability, including the second civil war. Today, there are over four million Facebook users in the country, more than two thirds of the population. In a place where traditional media institutions weakened alongside the state, social media did not just support the information space. It became the main space.
Different actors in the conflict, including politicians, armed groups and foreign powers, have used these platforms to push their own versions of reality. They discredit opponents, build support for themselves and shape public opinion. The result is not just disagreement. It is division. Different versions of the truth exist at the same time, each supported by its own audience.
Research by BBC Media Action, published in July 2021, shows how widespread this problem is. It found that 96% of Libyans surveyed said they had seen false or misleading information on social media. About 59% said they see it at least every week and around 80% said they are worried about disinformation. This pervasive rise of disinformation is exactly why Reporters Without Borders described Libya as “a veritable information black hole,” ranking it 138th out of 180 countries in its World Press Freedom Index.
The lack of independent media in this country exasperates this problem. In other parts of the world, people usually turn to major news outlets to confirm the validity of any news on social media. In Libya, however, the nature of the media landscape is an obstacle in itself. Most major news outlets are now clearly linked to one political side or another. Their reporting often reflects political positions rather than independent journalism. Because of this, many people do not turn to the media to check facts. Furthermore, Libyan journalists have faced intimidation and violence for years. While there have been some improvements since the end of major fighting, the situation remains fragile. In both the east and the west, authorities and their armed groups have created an environment of fear. This has weakened media independence across the country.
This is not accidental. The lack of a strong legal framework to protect press freedom affects everything. It limits transparency and reduces access to reliable information. It forces the public to turn to social media which the warring parties would then flood with fake news. . Without clear protections, it becomes difficult for independent journalism to survive. This creates a gap in the information space and that gap can be used by others.
Foreign information manipulation and interference, often referred to as FIMI, has found space to grow in Libya. Russia is one of the most visible actors in this area. It first gained influence on the ground through its affiliated mercenary network, the Wagner Group. Its presence was not only military. It also extended into the information space.
Research by the Stanford Internet Observatory shows how Wagner-linked online networks were used in Libya to influence political discussions. One documented case found that a major focus of these networks was political events such as peace talks and conferences. Rather than simply reporting on them, the aim was to shape how they were understood inside Libya’s information space. For example, the research highlights that these Russian networks aggressively attempted to disrupt the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in November 2020. It produced coordinated content that clearly stood out from regular online activity.
The same research notes that this activity did not just add noise to the information environment. It played a role in increasing tensions in an already fragile context. It described the effect as a form of destabilization that made existing divisions worse.
This influence has not been limited to online discussions. It has also taken more direct political forms. In 2019, Libyan authorities in Tripoli arrested two Russian nationals suspected of attempting to influence upcoming elections. The two men were later reported to be linked to Wagner. According to investigations, they were involved in efforts to secure access to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and had reportedly held multiple meetings with him by April 2019. Their activities pointed to early attempts to shape Libya’s political future before any formal electoral process had even begun.
These efforts were supported by coordinated online campaigns. Research later showed that a disinformation operation linked to Wagner was promoting more than one potential political figure ahead of the proposed 2021 elections. This included content that revived nostalgia for Muammar Gaddafi and messaging that supported Saif al-Islam as a candidate. The network used Facebook pages managed from outside Libya, including by operators in Egypt, while presenting itself as local. The content mixed political messaging with emotional appeals, which made it more persuasive and harder to question.
At the same time, Russian involvement extended into traditional media. Investigation by an independent Russian media outlet called Proekt, based on leaked documents from the Dossier Center, reported that a Wagner-linked network had acquired a 50% stake in both Aljamahiria TV and the Jana News Agency, both of which are media outlets serving pro-Gaddafi narratives. Aljamahiria TV was once the main state broadcaster under the Gaddafi regime and served as a central tool of state messaging. Russia’s investment in these media outlets highlights its efforts to blur the lines of media authenticity. It also shows why these types of foreign disinformation tactics are difficult to detect, as they are often carried out through local actors.
These influence campaigns appear to have had some visible impact on public discourse at the time. Online opinion polling began to show Saif al-Islam Gaddafi as one of the most favored candidates for the presidency at that time. However, the political process these campaigns were trying to shape did not hold. The planned presidential elections in 2021 collapsed, in part due to legal disputes over candidate eligibility, including whether Saif al-Islam Gaddafi could run.
In February 2026, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was reported killed by unknown gunmen. The motives remain unclear. Yet the question that follows is difficult to ignore. Did these coordinated campaigns exaggerate his public support to the point that it reshaped how others perceived him? Did a level of popularity, partly manufactured through sustained disinformation operations, backfire by turning him into a perceived threat by his political rivals?
It’s not possible to draw a direct line, but the possibility remains. In a climate where visibility can be engineered and support can be amplified, perception can carry as much weight as reality. What appears as public backing may not always reflect genuine sentiment, but it can still influence decisions, calculations, and fears among political actors.
In this kind of environment, disinformation does not simply distort reality. It actively participates in political outcomes. It shapes expectations, influences decisions, and can contribute to the breakdown of political processes. Libya is not only dealing with disinformation as a side effect of conflict. It is dealing with a system where information itself has become part of how the conflict works.
References
- BBC Media Action. (2021, July). Understanding Libyan social media users’ experiences of false and misleading information online
- Reporters Without Borders. (2026). World Press Freedom Index: Libya
- Human Rights Watch. (2015, February). War on the Media: Journalists under Attack in Libya
- Grossman, S., Ramali, K., DiResta, R., Beissner, L., Bradshaw, S., Healer, W., & Hubert, I. (2020, December 15). Stoking conflict by keystroke: An operation run by IRA-linked individuals targeting Libya, Sudan, and Syria. Stanford Internet Observatory
- Ryan, M., & Raghavan, S. (2019, November 18). Russians arrested as spies in Libya worked for Russian firm Wagner, official says. The Washington Post.
- Al-Atrush, S. (2020, March 20). How a Russian plan to restore Qaddafi’s Libyan regime backfired. Bloomberg.
- Arnold, T. D. (2020, September 23). Exploiting chaos: Russia in Libya. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
- Badanin, R., Zholobova, M., & Rubin, M. (2019, September 12). How Russia participates in the civil war in Libya. Proekt.
- Libya Review. (2021, September 30). Poll: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi will be Libya’s next president.
- Eaton, T. (2026, February 5). The killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is the end of a political era in Libya. Chatham House.